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ABSTRACT
Background: Recent literature on addiction and judgments about the characteristics of
agents has focused on the implications of adopting a “brain disease” versus “moral weak-
ness” model of addiction. Typically, such judgments have to do with what capacities an
agent has (e.g., the ability to abstain from substance use). Much less work, however, has
been conducted on the relationship between addiction and judgments about an agent’s
identity, including whether or to what extent an individual is seen as the same person after
becoming addicted. Methods: We conducted a series of vignette-based experiments (total
N¼ 3,620) to assess lay attitudes concerning addiction and identity persistence, systematic-
ally manipulating key characteristics of agents and their drug of addiction. Conclusions: In
Study 1, we found that U.S. participants judged an agent who became addicted to drugs as
being closer to “a completely different person” than “completely the same person” as the
agent who existed prior to the addiction. In Studies 2–6, we investigated the intuitive basis
for this result, finding that lay judgments of altered identity as a consequence of drug use
and addiction are driven primarily by perceived negative changes in the moral character of
drug users, who are seen as having deviated from their good true selves.
KEYWORDS
addiction; personal identity;
true self; essential moral
self; Phineas Gage effect
Introduction
According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), between 1999 and 2016, more than
630,000 people died from drug overdoses in the United
States, with more than 350,000 of those due to opioids
(Seth et al. 2018). Frequently described as an “epidemic,”
the problem of opioid addiction has worsened in recent
years, with prescription opioids drawing particular atten-
tion. In addition to calls for greater awareness of the
social, economic, and public health consequences of opi-
oid overuse (Council of Economic Advisors 2017; Smith
2018), there is also a need to understand the effects of
such use at a more personal level, including its impact
on families and close relationships (Egan 2018). Here,
we explore an important but understudied aspect of this
impact: the effects of drug abuse and addiction on judg-
ments of personal identity.
A common refrain is that addiction changes a per-
son. In a memoir about her son’s drug addiction,
one author writes: “Six years have passed since I
discovered that my son was using drugs. I [was] devas-
tated, not to mention how worried I was about his well-
being. My son was not the same person anymore”
(Urzia 2014, emphasis added). Similarly, on an addic-
tion resource webpage, one testimonial states, “My hus-
band was a normal, kind, genuine person for the first
few years of our marriage. He suddenly became
addicted to cocaine and has become a different person”
(Anonymous 2015). As Tobia (2017) notes, such stories
are heartbreakingly common: “Many,” he writes, “have
witnessed someone they loved change so profoundly
that the person remaining seems an entirely differ-
ent one.”
Why might people have such feelings about a loved
one who has become addicted? Why do they see them
as a different person (and in what sense)? One possi-
bility seems obvious: We recognize people, in large
part, by their characteristic actions, and people often
act very differently when they become addicted.
Imagine someone named Jim. Before abusing drugs,
he was fun, outgoing, and dependable. But after the
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addiction took hold, he became withdrawn, irritable,
and unreliable. Seemingly, these changes in demeanor
could explain why Jim’s friends and family come to
see him as a different person than he used to be.
However, it may not be so simple. Recent work in
psychology and experimental philosophy (see Knobe
2016; Knobe and Nichols 2008; Knobe et al. 2012; Cova
et al. 2018) suggests that intuitions about changed iden-
tity are shaped not just by the fact of some change in
demeanor after a transformative event (cf. Paul 2014),
but rather by the particular kind of change that occurs.
Specifically, if a person undergoes a change in their
moral attributes, they tend to be seen as far more
changed as a person than if they differ in terms of
almost any other identity-relevant trait: basic cognition,
memory, personality, desires and preferences, and even
sense perception (Strohminger and Nichols 2014).
The direction of change matters as well: When hold-
ing the magnitude of change constant, a person’s
becoming morally worse, compared to morally better,
makes them much less likely to be seen as the same
person as they were before (Tobia 2015, 2016). One
explanation for this asymmetry comes from good-true-
self theory (Strohminger, Knobe, and Newman 2017).
According to this theory, people typically regard others’
true selves as being fundamentally good, holding all
else equal (Newman, Bloom, and Knobe 2014; De
Freitas et al. 2018; Newman, De Freitas, and Knobe
2015; Bench et al. 2015). Thus, if a person undergoes a
change in character from morally bad to good, people
tend to interpret this not as becoming an entirely dif-
ferent person, but rather, finally realizing or becoming
one’s true self (Bench et al. 2015; Tobia 2017).
However, if one undergoes a change in the opposite
direction, even if it is the same magnitude of change,
one is seen as moving farther away from one’s true self,
and thus as a different person (Tobia 2015).
In this work, we explore whether these recent
advances in understanding lay perceptions of identity
change apply to the case of addiction. This is an
important line of inquiry for two reasons, one theoret-
ical, and one more practical. The theoretical reason is
that the literature on such perceptions has so far
relied most prominently on fantastical or unlikely
cases, such as brain-transplant thought experiments
(Strohminger and Nichols 2014; but for more realistic
scenarios see Strohminger and Nichols 2015) or pecu-
liar accidents, such as the historical Phineas Gage
story, wherein an unfortunate railroad worker had an
iron rod shot through his head (Tobia 2015). While
such extreme scenarios may be helpful for clarifying
people’s intuitions about what is most central to
judgments of identity persistence—that is, the extent
to which an individual is regarded as essentially the
same person over time—it is not yet clear whether
more common, real-life cases, such as becoming
addicted to drugs, fit the same pattern of intuitions.
And the practical reason it is important is that if
addiction does affect judgments of identity in the way
we suggest, this could have profound consequences
for how people understand and relate to persons with
addiction in everyday life.
Here is our plan for what follows. First, we briefly
discuss the literature on addiction and identity in its
qualitative sense: the sense concerned with what an
agent is like, or what characteristics she has. Then, we
ask whether addiction might affect people’s judgments
about identity persistence: the extent to which an
individual is seen as the same person over time, des-
pite changes in such personal characteristics. In this
context, we expect that changes in moral characteris-
tics will prove especially important, as will the direc-
tion of change, from morally good to bad or vice
versa. We then give an overview of the empirical stud-
ies we conducted to test this idea, summarizing our
main findings along the way. Near the end of the art-
icle, we situate these results in the context of wider
debates about the nature of personal identity and
draw some speculative conclusions about the implica-
tions of treating addiction for close relationships.
Addiction and identity
Thinking about addiction in terms of identity is not
new (Bailey 2005). Primarily, the literature in this area
has been concerned with identity in a qualitative
sense—what a person is fundamentally like—often
cast in terms of the characteristics an individual has,
or is taken to have, in virtue of her addiction (Reith
2004). Are persons with addiction free moral agents,
for example, who are responsible for their behavior
while under the influence of drugs, or for becoming
addicted to drugs in the first place (Yaffe 2001)? Or
are they passive victims of a “brain disease” and thus
deserving of social support and medical treatment
rather than stigma or moral censure (Leshner 1997)?
A more recent view based in learning theory holds
that addiction is essentially a powerful habit formed
through the accelerated pursuit of valued mental
states, not unlike the process of falling in love (Lewis,
2017; see also Earp et al. 2017a; Earp et al. 2017b).
Other models have also been proposed.
At first glance, each view seems to imply something
different about the kind of person one is when
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addicted. The weakness-of-will model holds that
addiction is a blameworthy matter reflecting impru-
dent choices or an impoverished character. The brain
disease model holds that addiction entails a relatively
faultless loss of agency. The learning model holds that
addiction reflects ordinary brain functioning taken to
an extreme in response to certain patterns and types
of reward. Based on these and other differences, it is
often assumed that what people think about the quali-
tative identity of addicted agents will turn on which
model of addiction is widely accepted (for a general
discussion, see O’Connor and Joffe 2013).
However, empirical support for this view is limited.
In particular, the idea that characterizing addiction as
a brain disease will combat stigma or reduce attribu-
tions of moral responsibility has not been consistently
supported (Meurk et al. 2014; Piras et al. 2016; Racine
et al. 2017). Moreover, the studies that do exist in this
vein tend to treat addiction as a static state, compar-
ing lay attitudes as a function of various ways addic-
tion might be described. But addiction is not
something a person is born with. Rather, it is a state
one enters into and potentially leaves, in the context
of social judgments and identity descriptions that
often have a more narrative structure, tracking
changes in personal attributes through time (Buchman
and Reiner 2009). Given that work in psychology and
experimental philosophy has looked at such judg-
ments as they relate to qualitative identity shifts in
other contexts, it may be fruitful to apply a similar set
of methods to the topic of addiction.
As discussed, this work shows that changes in
moral attributes are more important for judgments of
altered identity than other personal attributes
(Strohminger and Nichols 2014; Strohminger, Knobe,
and Newman 2017; Heiphetz, Strohminger, and
Young 2017), and that moral deterioration, compared
to moral improvement, is especially important for
shaping such judgments (Tobia 2015, 2016, 2017).
Since addiction is a highly moralized phenomenon, it
stands to reason that similar judgments would apply.
In other words, insofar as an agent’s becoming
addicted to drugs may lead to the perception that they
are a “different person”—as suggested by the anec-
dotes in the previous section—this may be due to a
presumed diminishment in moral character that such
addiction stereotypically brings about.
To test this hypothesis, we conducted six studies
with a combined sample of 3,620U.S. participants. In
Study 1, we sought to establish the basic phenomenon
to be explained: Going beyond anecdotes, do people
really regard others as undergoing a change in identity
as a consequence of addiction? By describing a char-
acter named Jim either becoming addicted to drugs or
recovering from addiction, and asking participants to
rate the extent to which he has changed or stayed the
same as a person, we find that addicted Jim is judged
to be far closer to a “completely different” person
than “completely the same” person as he was before
the addiction. In Study 2, which includes a replication
of Study 1, we attempt to tease apart whether it is the
physical effects of the drug of addiction or the moral
implications of taking it that are responsible for such
judgments. To do this, we manipulated the moral sta-
tus of the drug while holding its physical effects con-
stant, describing it as medicine in one condition
(good drug) and as an addictive drug (bad drug) in
another. We find some support for the “moral status”
interpretation, but not without ambiguity. In Study 3,
therefore, we made the moral effects of the drug on
Jim’s character explicit, finding that moral deterior-
ation led to greater judgments of changed identity
than moral improvement, supporting our explanatory
framework. To ensure that this was not a vignette-
specific effect, in Study 4, we conducted a preregis-
tered conceptual replication and extension study
involving four new vignettes, all of which described a
character undergoing moral improvement versus
deterioration as a result of drug use, with similar
results. We also directly asked participants in this
study about the extent to which each character had
grown closer to, or farther away from, their “true self”
as a result of the moral change, finding further sup-
port for our hypothesis. In Studies 5 and 6, we con-
sider competing explanations for our findings, and
attempt to rule these out. In the end, we find that the
moral badness of changes to character associated with
drug abuse and addiction is largely responsible for
participant intuitions concerning altered identity, cor-
responding to judgments that the addicted agent has
moved away from their good true self.
Study 1
Study 1 sought to determine whether or to what
extent people believe that acquiring an addiction can
result in changes to identity. This study and the ones
described later were considered exempt by the
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Yale University
(IRB Protocol 0907005485). All of the studies con-
ducted for this research project are reported in this
article; we affirm that there is no file drawer to skew
the reported findings (Rosenthal 1979). All of the
materials, data, and syntax for reproducing analyses
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are available on the Open Science Framework (OSF)
at osf.io/bm96x.
Method
Participants. Two hundred eighty-nine U.S. partici-
pants were recruited via the online service Mechanical
Turk (MTurk), and received $0.40 for their time.1 No
a priori power analysis was conducted for this prelim-
inary study; sample size was determined by available
resources and past experience with experiments of
this kind. A post hoc power analysis using G"Power
(Faul et al. 2007) with a ¼ .05 revealed that we had
92.9% observed power to detect an effect size of
Cohen’s d ¼ .45. Participants (n¼ 55) were excluded
for failing to complete the entire survey or giving the
incorrect answer to an embedded manipulation/atten-
tion check. Excluding these participants resulted in a
final sample of 235 participants (105 female; Mage ¼
36.56, SD¼ 11.63).
Procedure. Participants completed an online survey
in a between-subjects design. Participants were given
one of two stories about a man named Jim. In one
story, Jim was described as becoming addicted to
drugs, and in the other, as recovering from addiction.
To stimulate concrete intuitions about the cases pre-
sented rather than abstract reasoning about the gen-
eral relationship between addiction and identity
change, specific but morally neutral details were
included about Jim and his life. This introductory
paragraph read as follows:
Jim is 27 years old. He graduated from Briarcrest
High School in a town called Bloomington when he
was 17. Since then, he’s attended community college,
traveled some, worked different jobs, and learned
how to play the guitar. He likes listening to music
and spending time with his friends. Jim’s mother is a
librarian, and his father works for an insurance
company. He has a sister named Mary, and a brother
named Albert.
Then participants saw one of two paragraphs (the
labels below are for clarity; they were not shown to
participants):
Starting addiction. Jim didn’t used to be addicted to
drugs, but now he is. About a year ago, some big
changes happened in Jim’s life, and he became
addicted to drugs. Like most addicts, he finds it very
difficult to refrain from seeking out and consuming
drugs, even when there are bad consequences. When
he is prevented from taking his drug, he experiences
very unpleasant feelings of withdrawal. He now
spends a lot of his time thinking about, and seeking,
the drug of his addiction.
Stopping addiction. Jim used to be addicted to drugs,
but now he isn’t. About a year ago, some big changes
happened in Jim’s life, and he stopped being addicted
to drugs. Like most addicts, he used to find it very
difficult to refrain from seeking out and consuming
drugs, even when there were bad consequences.
When he was prevented from taking his drug, he
experienced very unpleasant feelings of withdrawal.
He used to spend a lot of his time thinking about,
and seeking, the drug of his addiction.
Participants were asked to “Think about how Jim is
right now, compared to how he was before those big
changes happened in his life. To what extent do you
feel that Jim, as a person, has changed or stayed the
same? On the next few pages you’ll receive some
questions and statements to try to get at your
intuition.” Participants then answered the identity
change questions described in the following. As an
exploratory measure, they were also asked which
model of addiction they personally subscribed to: the
“brain disease” (medical) model, or the “weakness-of-
will” (moral) model; results for this measure are
reported in in the online supplementary materials.
They then responded to an attention check and filled
out some basic demographic information. At the end
of the survey they were debriefed and thanked for
their time.
Measures. Identity change. Participants were given,
in random order, two questions and two statements
designed to capture their intuitions about whether or
to what extent Jim had changed as a person. The
questions were:
1. “In terms of changing or staying the same, how
much would you say that Jim is the same or a
completely different person than before?”
2. “How much has Jim changed as a person, if
at all?”
For the first question, participants were given a slid-
ing scale ranging from 0 to 100, with 0 labeled “exactly
the same person as before” and 100 labeled “completely
different person than before,” and were asked to mark
their response anywhere along the scale. For the second
question, the scale ranged from 0 (“not at all”) to 100
“(a great deal”). The statements were:
1. “There is a sense in which Jim is not really the
same person anymore.”
1We note that MTurk samples tend to be more demographically diverse
than traditional student samples, but they are not nationally
representative (Buhrmester et al. 2011). Generalization is therefore
not advised.
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2. “Jim is now pretty different from what he used to
be all about.”
For each statement, participants were asked to indi-
cate how much they agreed or disagreed along the
same 100-point scale, ranging from 0 (“completely
disagree”) to 100 (“completely agree”). The four items
formed a reliable measure (a ¼ .926), identity change,
that served as the dependent variable.
Manipulation/attention check. Participants were
told, “This is the last question, just to check if you
remember the story about Jim. At the end of the
story, was Jim addicted to drugs or not addicted to
drugs?” They were then asked to pick between (1)
“Jim was addicted to drugs” and (2) “Jim was NOT
addicted to drugs.” Participants who chose the incor-
rect answer based on their condition were excluded
from all further analyses.
Results
As predicted, there was a main effect of condition, such
that Jim was perceived as undergoing more identity
change when becoming addicted (M¼ 74.40, SD¼ 19.63)
compared to recovering from addiction (M¼ 65.05,
SD¼ 21.91), t(233) ¼ 3.45, p ¼ .001, d ¼ .45. In both
conditions, the mean was above the midpoint of the scale
(becoming addicted: t(122) ¼ 13.79, p < .001, d¼ 1.76;
recovering from addiction: t(111) ¼ 7.27, p < .001, d ¼
.97), suggesting that, in either case, Jim was perceived as
closer to a “completely different” person than “completely
the same” person after the described changes.
Discussion
Study 1 was designed to answer the question, “Do peo-
ple regard others as undergoing a change in identity as
a consequence of becoming addicted?” Our findings
point to a positive answer. Based on only a minimal
description of becoming addicted to drugs, participants
rated Jim as highly changed as a person compared to
how he was before the addiction. Curiously, however,
participants also rated Jim as highly changed when
recovering from addiction (albeit to a lesser degree).
How might one explain this finding?2
Imagine that Jim is your friend. For quite some
time, you have known him as someone addicted to
drugs. As described in the vignette, he always found
it difficult to refrain from using drugs, even when
there were bad consequences (a core sign of addic-
tion on many accounts). He also showed symptoms
of physiological dependence, like withdrawal, and in
general his thoughts and behavior were consumed
with seeking out his next hit. So, however disagree-
able some of these attributes might be from a certain
perspective, that is the Jim you know. But now,
some “big changes” have happened in his life, and
those familiar attributes no longer apply. Jim has
cleaned up his act, to be sure, and that is presum-
ably a good thing—but he does seem rather different
now compared to how he was before. Thus, the
observed ratings for identity change in this condition
should not be too surprising.
What is important for our purposes, however, is
the difference between conditions, and in particular
the degree of change between starting and stopping
addiction. This difference was in the expected direc-
tion: Participants rated Jim as less changed as a per-
son when he recovered from his addiction to drugs
(an improvement) than when he became addicted to
drugs (the reverse). Thus, the overall pattern of results
is consistent with the so-called Phineas Gage Effect
(Tobia 2015), according to which a person is seen as
undergoing greater identity change if they experience
a moral deterioration in their character, as compared
to a moral improvement.
There is a catch, however. The vignettes don’t actu-
ally say that Jim’s moral characteristics changed from
Time 1 to Time 2, apart from a passing reference to
his seeking out and consuming drugs “even when
there were bad consequences.” Instead, they primarily
refer to various physical or behavioral effects that are
often associated with drug addiction, namely, finding
it hard to refrain from taking the drug, experiencing
unpleasant feelings when one is prevented from taking
it, and so on.
One possibility, then, is that participants were
tracking this physical-behavioral dimension, with the
intuition being that losing such unpleasant aspects of
addiction—presumably caused by the drug itself—is
not as disruptive to identity as acquiring them. After
all, if one starts to take a drug that causes one to be
distracted and unhappy when one is not on it, it may
seem that it is the drug that is really doing the work.
By contrast, if one stops taking such a drug, one
might be seen as simply reverting to one’s baseline
self. This could explain why Jim was seen as less
2A theoretically uninteresting explanation for this concordance between
conditions is that participants simply like to mark responses above the
midpoint of a scale: Across all four items measuring identity change,
greater change was always tied to the right-hand side of the scale,
whereas less change was tied to the left. While this was done on purpose
to be more intuitive to participants (i.e., conform to the left–right reading
bias), it is possible that counterbalancing the left–right orientation of the
scale would make a difference in future studies.
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changed as a person when he lost his addiction com-
pared to acquiring it, without the need to invoke
moral considerations. To explore this issue, we con-
ducted another study.
Study 2
Our goal in Study 2 was to keep the physical conse-
quences of starting or stopping the use of a drug con-
stant, while manipulating the moral valence of such
use. One way to keep the physical effects constant while
changing moral valence is to describe a drug as
“medicine” in one condition (where it will presumably
be seen as morally good or at least neutral) while
describing it as “addictive” in another condition (where
it will presumably be seen as morally bad, given the
context and framing), keeping everything else the
same. This is the approach we took in Study 2.
Method
Participants. Four hundred and fifty U.S. participants
were recruited via MTurk, and received $0.40 for their
time. A post hoc power analysis with a ¼ .05 revealed
that we had 99.9% power to detect an effect size of
Cohen’s f ¼ .25. Participants (n¼ 34) were excluded
from analyses for failing the manipulation check or
not finishing the survey. Excluding these participants
resulted in a final sample of 416 participants (162
female; Mage ¼ 35.25, SD¼ 11.52).
3
Procedure. This study had a 2 (drug use: starting,
stopping) by 2 (drug valence: good, bad) between-sub-
jects experimental design. Participants read one of
four stories: two in which Jim was described as either
becoming addicted to drugs or recovering from his
addiction to drugs (the same stories as in Study 1),
and two in which he was described as either becoming
addicted to medication or recovering from his addic-
tion to medication. All physical effects of the
“addictive drugs” and “medication” were held constant
across conditions. The same introductory paragraph
from Study 1 was used, as was the four-item identity
change measure (a ¼ .927). Complete materials can
be found in the supplementary materials.
Results
A 2# 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the pre-
ceding design was conducted on identity change.
There was a main effect of drug valence on identity
change, F(1, 412) ¼ 26.347, p < .001, gp
2
¼ .060, with
bad drugs resulting in greater perceived identity
change (M¼ 66.53, SD¼ 22.55) than good drugs
(M¼ 55.41, SD¼ 21.93). There was no main effect of
condition, however, and no interaction (ps > .417).
Discussion
In Study 1, Jim was seen as changing more as a per-
son when he started taking a “bad” drug and became
addicted, than when he stopped taking the drug and
recovered from his addiction. Unexpectedly, in Study
2, this effect did not replicate. In fact, the mean score
for identity change in the starting/bad condition
(M¼ 66.74, SD¼ 24.92) is quite similar to the mean
in the stopping/bad condition (M¼ 66.37,
SD¼ 20.61), even though these conditions are identi-
cal to the ones from Study 1. This raises the possibil-
ity that our initial finding from Study 1 was a fluke or
statistical artifact. Before going any further, then, we
decided to run an exact replication of Study 1, albeit
with a larger sample size and without the exploratory
question concerning models of addiction.4
Results were mixed. Consistent with Study 1, par-
ticipants in the replication study did see Jim as chang-
ing more as a person in the starting/bad condition
(M¼ 70.93, SD¼ 20.36) than in the stopping/bad con-
dition (M¼ 67.35, SD¼ 17.49), t(327) ¼ 1.67, p ¼
.096, d ¼ .19. However, in contrast to Study 1, the
difference in means was only marginal by conven-
tional standards of statistical significance, and the
observed effect size was much smaller (d ¼ .19 in the
replication vs. d ¼ .45 in the original). The implica-
tions of this outcome are unclear. Particularly odd is
the near equality of the starting/bad versus stopping/
bad means in Study 2, compared to the large and stat-
istically significant difference between these means in
Study 1, and the marginal difference observed in the
replication. However, given the main effect of drug
valence in Study 2, the emerging picture seems to be
that if starting versus stopping a drug does play a role
in shaping intuitions about identity change, it is a
smaller role than that played by the goodness or bad-
ness of the drug, regardless of whether one is starting
or stopping its use. To explore this issue, we
conducted a follow-up study.
3Note that one participant listed their age as 1987; this was recoded to 30
on the assumption that the person had entered their birth year by mistake.
4For this replication attempt, 353 MTurkers were recruited (versus 290 in
the original study), of whom 24 were excluded for failing the attention
check. This left 329 participants (169 female, Mage ¼ 37.62, SD¼ 11.69).
As before, the four identity change items formed a reliable scale (a
¼ .90).
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Study 3
In Study 3, we sought to shift the focus more defini-
tively from the physical effects of drug use to its
moral effects. Recall that, in Study 2, we still did not
explicitly state how Jim’s moral character was changed
by the addictive drug, regardless of how it was
described. Rather, we retained the physical description
of the drug from Study 1, while attempting to
manipulate the moral status of its use by characteriz-
ing it as medication in one set of conditions. Our
assumption was that participants would see it as per-
missible and even desirable—in short, good—to use a
drug if it is serving a medical purpose, whereas they
would see it as bad to use a drug with similar addict-
ive properties if it was not serving a medical purpose.
However, given increased public attention to the crisis
surrounding addiction to prescription opioids—see
the introduction—this distinction may not have been
as strong as we assumed. In Study 3, therefore, we
decided to make explicit the moral effects of starting
or stopping the use of a drug, either medical or recre-
ational, on Jim’s personal characteristics and behavior.
In one set of conditions, Jim now experiences clear
moral improvement as a result of starting or stopping
the use of a drug, while in the other set, he experien-
ces clear moral deterioration.
In order to describe such moral changes without
being too heavy-handed (that is, without explicitly
stating that Jim’s moral character has changed as
such, or asking participants to rate Jim on his moral
character directly), it seemed necessary to give
participants a fuller description of his baseline
attributes. In the previous studies, this baseline was
nondescript: Participants were told Jim’s age, the
fact that he likes listening to music, the occupations
of his parents, and so forth. For this study, however,
we added a distinctive quality to the introductory
paragraph, as follows:
Jim is 27 years old. He graduated from Briarcrest
High School in a town called Bloomington when he
was 17. Since then, he’s attended community college,
traveled some, worked different jobs, and learned
how to play the guitar. Most importantly of all
though, since he was a little kid, Jim’s biggest dream
has been to become a successful poet.
Then, for each of the four conditions—starting or
stopping use of a recreational drug; starting or stop-
ping use of medication—we made explicit some of
Jim’s moral qualities at Times 1 and 2 (i.e., his motiv-
ation, responsibility, goal commitment, and reliability
as a friend), so that participants could infer the rele-
vant change in moral character. All other aspects of
the procedure, materials, and analysis were kept the
same as in Study 2.
Method
Participants. Six hundred and four U.S. participants
were recruited via MTurk, and received $0.50 for their
time. Sample size was determined by setting the floor
at 450 participants to match the previous study, with
the ceiling set by available funding. A post hoc power
analysis with a ¼ .05 revealed that we had 99.4%
power to detect an effect size of Cohen’s f ¼ .19 for
the predicted interaction. Participants (n¼ 25) were
excluded from analysis for failing the attention check
or not finishing the survey. Excluding these partici-
pants resulted in a final sample of 579 participants
(280 female; Mage ¼ 37.34, SD¼ 12.20).
Procedure. This study had a 2 (drug use: starting,
stopping) by 2 (drug valence: good, bad) between-sub-
jects experimental design. The procedure was the
same as in Study 2, with the same four-item identity
change measure (a ¼ .908). Complete materials can
be found in the supplementary materials.
Results
A 2# 2 ANOVA with the preceding design was con-
ducted on identity change. Consistent with Study 2,
although there was no main effect of starting/stop-
ping (p ¼ .821), there was a significant main effect
of drug valence, F(1, 575) ¼ 21.45, p < .001, gp
2
¼
.036, with bad drugs resulting in greater perceived
identity change (M¼ 73.71, SD¼ 19.29) than good
drugs (M¼ 65.39, SD¼ 23.45). However, this time,
the effect was qualified by a significant interaction
between drug valence and condition: F(1, 575) ¼
20.168, p < .001, gp
2
¼ .034. To break this inter-
action down, we conducted two separate independ-
ent-samples t-tests. In the good drug conditions,
there was greater perceived identity change when
Jim stopped taking the drug, leading to moral deteri-
oration (M¼ 68.99, SD ¼ 21.64), than when he
started taking the drug, leading to moral improve-
ment (M¼ 61.50, SD¼ 24.75), t(279) ¼ $2.71, p ¼
.007, d ¼ .32. Meanwhile, in the bad drug condi-
tions, there was greater perceived identity change
when Jim started taking the drug, leading to moral
deterioration (M¼ 77.52, SD ¼ 17.82), than when he
stopped taking the drug, leading to moral improve-
ment (M¼ 66.23, SD ¼ 20.04), t(296) ¼ 3.78, p <
.001, d ¼ .44 (Figure 1).
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Discussion
Several interesting findings emerged from this study.
First, it replicates the main effect of drug valence
(good versus bad) from Study 2: that is, independent
of whether Jim starts or stops using a drug, there is a
main effect of greater perceived identity change when
the drug in question is bad compared to good. This
might suggest that being “mixed up” in the putatively
immoral world of illegal, recreational drugs—even if
Jim has recently extricated himself—is enough to drive
perceptions of greater identity change compared to
being “mixed up” in the putatively good, or at least
less bad, world of prescription medication.
Second, there was the predicted interaction: Jim’s
identity was judged to have changed more when he
experienced moral deterioration (whether that was
caused by starting a bad drug or stopping a good
drug) than when he experienced moral improvement
(whether that was caused by starting a good drug or
stopping a bad drug). This finding brings the evidence
more into line with our proposed theoretical frame-
work—the good-true-self framework—according to
which greater perceived disruption to identity should
occur when an agent becomes morally worse com-
pared to morally better.
Finally, there was no main effect of starting versus
stopping. In other words, simply starting to take a
drug of one kind or another (whether medical or rec-
reational) was seen as no more relevant to identity
change than stopping such drug use altogether. This
might suggest that the supposed unnaturalness of
being addicted to an “artificial” chemical substance, as
in the case of various drug addictions, is not a major
factor in explaining why people seem so different
when grappling with an addiction compared to not.
Indeed, even when Jim had to start taking a drug in
order to experience moral improvement (and live out
his dream of becoming a poet), he was seen as less
changed as a person than when he stopped taking the
drug (i.e., “went off his meds”) insofar as this led to
moral deterioration. It is thus the good/bad dimension
(whether of drug type or change in moral character)
that seems primarily responsible for driving participant
intuitions about the degree of change in Jim’s identity.
Specifically, when the drug or direction of change is
good, holding magnitude and means of change con-
stant, Jim does not seem so different as a person com-
pared to when the drug or direction of change is bad.
Taken together, the results presented in this study
provide the strongest empirical support for our theoret-
ical expectations. It would be concerning, then, if they
turned out to be due to some idiosyncratic feature of
Jim and his poetic ambitions. To address this issue,
and in light of ongoing concerns about replicability in
psychology and experimental philosophy (Earp and
Trafimow 2015; Cova et al. 2018; LeBel et al. 2018), we
decided to conduct a preregistered replication and
extension study, in which we presented participants
(between subjects) with four structurally similar
vignettes—in addition to the one about Jim—describing
other characters with a wide range of personal attrib-
utes and goals, but all with the shared feature of expe-
riencing moral improvement versus deterioration as a
result of starting or stopping the use of a drug.
Study 4
To confirm the results of Study 3, and to ensure that
they were not vignette specific but rather reflective of
a deeper pattern of moral intuition, we conducted a
preregistered replication study, adding four new struc-
turally similar vignettes. In addition to Jim the Poet,
these vignettes concerned Lisa the Science Teacher,
Amal the Chiropractor, Jasmine the Artist, and Dale
the Truck Driver. The full text of these vignettes can
be seen in the online supplementary materials, and
the time-stamped preregistration form can be accessed
at http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x¼ri4c2q.
For this study, our primary dependent measure was
the same as in all previous studies, namely, identity
change. However, we decided to add two additional
measures for purposes of exploratory analysis: one
asking about changes to the character’s true self, to
see whether a more direct question about the theoret-
ical construct of interest would show results similar to
those of the relatively indirect measure we had so far
been using; and one asking about the character’s
responsibility for their behavior while taking the drug
Figure 1. Study 3 results: the effects of starting versus stop-
ping a good or bad drug on judgments of identity change.
Error bars represent standard error; the Y axis has been trun-
cated for ease of interpretation.
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in question. The reason we added the latter question
was to determine whether judgments of identity
change might simply be tracking perceived responsi-
bility. We also reincorporated the addiction model
question from Study 1 based on its theorized relation-
ship to such responsibility judgments. The results for
these last two measures are reported in the supple-
mentary materials, but in brief we found that identity
judgments did not simply reduce to responsibility
judgments, and that the relationship between such
judgments and participants’ preferred model of addic-
tion was—in contrast to what is commonly hypothe-
sized, as described in the introduction—negligible.
Method
Participants. An a priori power analysis using
G"Power 3 (Faul et al. 2007) revealed that for each
vignette, a sample size of n¼ 225 would be required to
detect a small-to-medium effect size using a conven-
tional a of .05 with .80 power. With five vignettes, this
yields a total desired sample size of n¼ 1125. Ultimately,
1,342U.S. participants took the survey via MTurk, each
receiving $0.50 for their time. Participants were excluded
from analysis for failing the attention check (n¼ 121) or
not finishing the survey (n¼ 43). Excluding these partic-
ipants resulted in a final sample of 1,178 participants
(551 female; Mage ¼ 36.13, SD¼ 11.29).
Procedure. This study had a 2 (drug use: starting,
stopping) by 2 (drug valence: good, bad) by 5
(vignette: Jim, Lisa, Amal, Jasmine, Dale) between-
subjects experimental design. The procedure was the
same as in Study 3, with the same four-item identity
change measure (a ¼ .920) and a new, single-item
true self measure. Complete materials can be found in
the supplementary materials.
Results
Confirmatory analysis. Identity change. A 2# 2 # 5
ANOVA with the described design was conducted on
identity change. Importantly, there was no main effect
of character (p ¼ .093), nor were there interactions
between character and condition (p ¼ .854) or drug
valence (p ¼ .390), nor interactions among character,
condition, and drug valence (p ¼ .073). Thus, no sin-
gle vignette—such as the story about Jim used in the
previous study—was responsible for driving the results
reported in this section.
As with Studies 2 and 3, there was a significant
main effect of drug valence on judgments of identity
change, F(1, 1158) ¼ 13.24, p < .001, gp
2
¼ .011, with
bad drugs resulting in greater perceived identity
change (M¼ 72.87, SD¼ 20.97) than good drugs
(M¼ 68.41, SD¼ 21.38), replicating our main finding.
Also consistent with Studies 2 and 3, there was no
main effect of starting/stopping (p ¼ .804). The pre-
dicted interaction also obtained. Just as in Study 3,
there was a significant interaction between drug
valence and condition: F(1, 1158) ¼ 55.48, p < .001,
gp
2
¼ .046, which we decomposed by performing two
separate 2 (condition) by 5 (character) ANOVAs.
As predicted, in the good drug conditions, when
the character started taking a good drug, leading to
moral improvement, their identity was seen as chang-
ing relatively less (M¼ 64.18, SD¼ 21.68) than when
they stopped taking a good drug, leading to moral
deterioration (M¼ 72.67, SD¼ 20.24), F(1,534) ¼
23.15, p < .001, gp
2
¼ .042. Also as predicted, in the
bad drug conditions, the opposite pattern obtained. In
other words, when the character started taking a bad
drug, leading to moral deterioration, their identity was
seen as changing relatively more (M¼ 77.37,
SD¼ 19.93) than when they stopped taking a bad
drug, leading to moral improvement (M¼ 68.13,




Exploratory analysis. True self. As preregistered,
an exploratory 2# 2 # 5 ANOVA with the described
design was conducted on true self judgments. As with
identity change, there was a significant main effect of
drug valence on true self judgments, F(1,1156) ¼ 5.52,
p ¼ .019, gp
2
¼ .05, with bad drugs resulting in
greater judged distance away from one’s true self
Figure 2. Study 4 results (identity change): the effects of start-
ing versus stopping a good or bad drug on judgments of iden-
tity change. Error bars represent standard error; the Y axis has
been truncated for ease of interpretation.
5In this case, while there was no interaction effect between character and
condition (p ¼ .105), there was a main effect of character, F(4,624) ¼
2.60, p ¼ .035, gp
2
¼ .016.
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(M¼ 54.65, SD¼ 35.12) than good drugs (M¼ 50.83,
SD¼ 30.91). Departing from the pattern of results for
identity change, there was also a main effect of condi-
tion (starting, stopping), F(1,1156) ¼ 94.98, p < .001,
gp
2
¼ .08, with starting any kind of drug resulting in
greater judged distance away from one’s true self
(M¼ 61.39, SD¼ 32.18) than stopping any kind of
drug (M¼ 44.11, SD¼ 32.12). There was no main
effect of character (p ¼ .333), nor were there interac-
tions between character and condition (p ¼ .657) or
drug valence (p ¼ .935).6
With respect to our main hypothesis, the predicted
interaction between drug valence and condition
obtained: F(1, 1156) ¼ 757.95, p < .001, gp
2
¼ .40.
To decompose this interaction, we performed two sep-
arate 2 (condition) by 5 (character) ANOVAs. In the
good drug conditions, when the character started tak-
ing a good drug, leading to moral improvement, they
were seen as being far closer to their true self
(M¼ 37.63, SD¼ 27.42) than when they stopped tak-
ing a good drug, leading to moral deterioration
(M¼ 64.07, SD¼ 28.50), F(1, 533) ¼ 116.66, p < .001,
gp
2
¼ .180.7 In the bad drug conditions, the opposite
pattern obtained: When the character started taking a
bad drug, leading to moral deterioration, they were
seen as being much further away from their true self
(M¼ 81.27, SD¼ 20.16) than when they stopped tak-
ing a bad drug, leading to moral improvement
(M¼ 26.55, SD¼ 23.82), F(1, 623) ¼ 966.13, p < .001,
gp
2
¼ .608 (Figure 3).
Discussion
Taken together, the results from Studies 1 through 4
appear to support the good-true-self theoretical frame-
work we introduced at the beginning of this article.
But there are some remaining ambiguities.
Specifically, it is hard to tell the relative contribution
of goodness or badness of drug versus goodness or
badness of change in moral character in affecting par-
ticipant perceptions of changed identity. This is
because the good drug (i.e., medical substance) was
described as having good effects on the moral attrib-
utes and behavior of the characters, whereas the bad
drug (i.e., recreational substance) was described as
having bad effects. Because the presumed moral qual-
ity of the drug itself is conflated with the direction of
change in moral character, the strongest test of the
good-true-self theory as it relates to addiction remains
elusive: Do people who become addicted to drugs
seem like “not the same person” as before because of
something about their drug of addiction and how we
think of it and its various effects? Or is it the negative
moral changes to the addicted person’s character that
truly explain the intuition? To address this issue, we
conducted a fifth study.
Study 5
Recall that, according to good-true-self theory, each of
us is (as a default) perceived as having a true inner
essence that is fundamentally good: The more we
move away from this essence, the further we appear
to be from our true self. By contrast, when we move
toward the essence—by being and acting as moral as
we can—the closer we appear to be to our true self,
and thus less changed as a person (as measured from
that anchor point) over time and across other forms
of change. Accordingly, if becoming addicted to a
putatively bad, illegal substance nevertheless caused an
agent to become more moral—by whatever strange
mechanism—people should judge the agent as having
undergone less change in identity at Time 2 compared
to the case in which she becomes morally worse by
one means or another.
To test this idea, we began by eliminating the start-
ing versus stopping distinction, since previous studies
showed that this was far less important than moral
valence; we also returned to a single story about Jim,
since Study 4 showed that using different vignettes
did not substantially affect the main findings. This
freed us up to create set of cases in which all aspects
were held constant apart from the moral valence of
the drug and the direction of change in Jim’s moral
Figure 3. Study 4 results (true self): the effects of starting ver-
sus stopping a good or bad drug on judgments of distance
from the true self. Error bars represent standard error.
6In contrast to the confirmatory results for identity change, there was a
three-way interaction among character, condition, and drug status on
true self judgments: F(4,1156) ¼ 3.45, p ¼ .008, gp
2
¼ .012; however, the
very same pattern of significant two-way interactions between condition
and drug status occurred for all five characters (all ps < .005), with only
the effect sizes differing.
7There was also an interaction between character and condition, F(4,533)
¼ 2.49, p ¼ .043, gp
2
¼ .018.
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character, allowing us to better tease those fac-
tors apart.8
Method
Participants. Six hundred and one U.S. participants
were recruited via MTurk, and received $0.50 for their
time. Sample size was set to match Study 3. A post
hoc power analysis with a ¼ .05 revealed that we had
67.3% power to detect an effect size of Cohen’s f ¼
.10 for the predicted interaction. Participants (n¼ 25)
were excluded from analysis for failing the attention
check or not finishing the survey. Excluding these
participants resulted in a final sample of 576 partici-
pants (274 female; Mage ¼ 36.24, SD¼ 11.01).
Procedure. This study had a 2 (drug valence: good,
bad) by 2 (moral character change valence: good, bad)
between-subjects experimental design. The procedure
was the same as in Study 4, with the same four-item
identity change measure (a ¼ .924) and the new, sin-
gle-item true self measure. After the same initial
prompt described in Study 1, participants read one of
four stories, in which Jim’s moral character underwent
a change for the better or worse as a result of taking a
good (medicine) or bad (illegal, recreational) drug.
The introductory paragraph described in Study 3 was
used for all four conditions, except that the sentence
describing Jim’s desire to become a poet was deleted.
Complete materials can be found in the supplemen-
tary materials.
Results
Identity change. A 2# 2 ANOVA with the described
design was conducted on identity change. In contrast
to previous studies, there was no main effect of drug
valence on judgments of identity change (p ¼ .164),
whereas there was a main effect of moral character
change valence, F(1,572) ¼ 4.84, p ¼ .006, gp
2
¼ .01,
with Jim judged to have undergone less change in his
identity when he became a good person (M¼ 71.304,
SD¼ 22.52) compared to when he became a bad per-
son (M¼ 76.25, SD¼ 20.74). This result is consistent
with our predictions and theoretical framework, sug-
gesting that it is the change in the moral character of
the person, rather than the moral characteristics of
the drug itself, that is most relevant in affecting intu-
itions about identity change.
An interaction was observed between drug valence
and moral character change valence, F(1,572) ¼ 4.84, p
¼ .028, gp
2
¼ .01, which we decomposed with two separ-
ate t-tests. Curiously, in the good drug conditions, ratings
for identity change were similar regardless of whether
the drug caused Jim to become a good person
(M¼ 74.57, SD¼ 18.63) or a bad person (M¼ 75.53,
SD¼ 21.19), t(288) ¼ $.41, p ¼ .680, d ¼ .05. However,
in the bad drug conditions, as predicted, participants
rated Jim as undergoing less identity change when he
became a good person (M¼ 68.04, SD¼ 25.42) com-
pared to when he became a bad person (M¼ 77.00,
SD¼ 20.30), t(284) ¼ $3.22, p ¼ .001, d ¼ .39. As can
be seen in Figure 4, Jim was rated as having the least
identity change in the “counterintuitive”’ case in which a
bad drug actually caused him to become a good person.
This is exactly what was predicted by our theory.
True self. Next, a 2# 2 ANOVA with the same
design was conducted on true self. Consistent with
the identity change analysis, there was no main effect
of drug valence on judgments about the true self (p ¼
.745), whereas there was a main effect of moral char-
acter change valence, F(1,572) ¼ 81.63, p < .001, gp
2
¼ .13, with Jim being judged much closer to his true
self when he became a good person (M¼ 63.04,
SD¼ 27.27) compared to when he became a bad per-
son (M¼ 81.68, SD¼ 20.66). This result, too, is con-
sistent with our predictions and theoretical
framework, suggesting that it is the change in the
moral character of the person, rather than the moral
characteristics of the drug itself, that is most relevant
Figure 4. Study 5 results (identity change): the effects of tak-
ing a good or bad drug leading to becoming a good or bad
person on judgments of identity change. Error bars represent
standard error; the Y axis has been truncated for ease of
interpretation.
8Another ambiguity with the previous studies concerned the amount of
time Jim or the other characters had been characterized by certain
attributes and behaviors (i.e., “for quite some time”) before the
introduction or cessation of the drug, which made it difficult to know
what baseline participants intuitively saw Jim or the others returning to
or departing from in making their judgments. To remove this ambiguity,
all vignettes now start with “For most of his life,” so that participants will
have a more uniform basis for making their assessments of changed
identity. Finally, in the bad drug conditions, rather than referring to the
drug as “addictive” and simply assuming that participants will infer that it
is an illegal, recreational substance, as in the earlier studies, we now
explicitly describe the drug as such.
AJOB EMPIRICAL BIOETHICS 11
in affecting intuitions about the true self. No interac-
tions were observed (p ¼ .281). For the overall pattern
of results see Figure 5.
Discussion
In previous studies, the moral valence of the drug and
the moral valence of the change in character were
overlapping. To tease these variables apart, in Study 5,
we created a scenario in which a bad drug counterin-
tuitively resulted in moral improvement, predicting
that this would lead to lower ratings for identity
change compared to a drug of whatever valence
resulting in moral deterioration. This is what we
found, supporting our theory. Surprisingly, however,
when a good drug resulted in moral improvement
(which should also have led to lower ratings of iden-
tity change), Jim was rated as having changed as a
person to a similar extent as when a drug of either
valence resulted in moral deterioration. This was not
predicted by our theory. One possibility is that the
anomalous result was due to sampling error. Indeed,
when we turn to true self ratings, we see the expected
pattern of results: When a good or bad drug leads to
moral deterioration, the character is judged as being
much further from his true self than when a drug of
either valence leads to moral improvement.
We have now provided substantial evidence that the
predictions of good-true-self theory (GTS) are borne
out in the case of addiction and drug use. In so doing,
we have united two previously separate literatures,
which we hope will inspire further research. However,
we have by no means shown that GTS is the only the-
ory that can explain the results we have observed.
Another theory in philosophy that touches on similar
questions is Frankfurt’s (1971) account of free will and
the concept of a person.9 In his famous comparison of
two people addicted to narcotics, one willing and the
other unwilling, Frankfurt draws a distinction between
first-order desires (e.g., the desire to take a drug or
refrain from taking a drug) and what he calls second-
order volitions: a kind of meta-desire by which a per-
son “identifies” with one first-order desire or another.
On a broadly Frankfurtian theory (FT), one might
think that this second-order endorsement is what
reveals a person’s true self, not just the moral valence
of one’s desires, disposition, or behavior. But then, peo-
ple do tend to endorse or identify with the positive
aspects of their moral character, whereas they tend to
resist or disidentify with the negative aspects. Thus, in
the typical case, GTS and FT will make the same pre-
diction. Specifically, moral deterioration could be seen
as (1) movement away from one’s good true self, which
would lead to higher ratings for identity change, or (2)
movement away from what one identifies with in terms
of second-order volitions, which would also lead to
higher ratings. It is only in the “counterintuitive” case
where one actually endorses negative changes to one’s
moral character that the theories come apart: FT pre-
dicts relatively low ratings for perceived identity
change, whereas GTS predicts relatively high ratings.
To address this issue, we conducted one final study,
which we preregistered with aspredicted.org in order to




Participants. A conservative a priori power analysis
using G"Power 3 revealed that a sample size of
N¼ 787 would be required to detect a small effect size
using a conventional a of .05 with .80 power. To
account for possible exclusions, we recruited 800 par-
ticipants on MTurk; 798 completed the entire survey
and passed a simple test designed to catch any auto-
mated bots, which had become a concern in the inter-
val between running the previous studies and the
current study (Dreyfuss 2018). Participants received
$0.50 each for their time. Following the preregistration,
participants were excluded prior to data analysis for
failing one or both of two embedded attention checks
(N¼ 162). This resulted in a final sample of 636 partic-
ipants (351 female; Mage ¼ 37.94, SD¼ 12.44).
Procedure. This study had a 2 (moral character
change valence: good, bad) by 2 (second-order
Figure 5. Study 5 results (true self): the effects of taking a
good or bad drug leading to becoming a good or bad person
on judgments of distance from the true self. Error bars repre-
sent standard error; the Y axis has been truncated for ease of
interpretation.
9We are indebted to an anonymous referee for this helpful suggestion.
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endorsement: yes, no) between-subjects experimental
design. The procedure was the same as in Study 5,
with the same four-item identity change measure (a ¼
.874) and the new, single-item true self measure.
Participants were given the same initial prompt
described in Study 1. They then saw one of four sto-
ries, in which Jim’s moral character underwent a
change for the better or worse as a result of taking a
drug (described as medication in all four cases), but
in which he had second-order volition to be either a
“bad boy” or a “good old Jim” before undergoing the
change. The introductory paragraph described in
Study 5 was used for all four conditions. Complete
materials can be found online (https://osf.io/bm96x/).
Results
Confirmatory analysis. Identity change. A 2# 2
ANOVA with the previously described design was con-
ducted on identity change. As predicted by GTS, there was
a main effect of moral-character-change valence on judg-
ments of identity change, F(1,632) ¼ 4.40, p ¼ .036, gp
2
¼
.01, with Jim judged to have undergone less change in his
identity when he became a good person (M¼ 76.34,
SD¼ 18.88) compared to when he became a bad person
(M¼ 79.81, SD¼ 15.81), independent of whether he actu-
ally endorsed the moral change from a second-order per-
spective. And as predicted by FT, there was a main effect
of endorsement, F(1,632)¼ 8.48, p¼ .004, gp
2
¼ .01, with
Jim judged to have undergone less change in his identity
when he endorsed the moral change (M¼ 75.77,
SD¼ 16.23) compared to when he did not endorse the
moral change (M¼ 79.65, SD¼ 18.47), independent of
whether he became a good or bad person.
An interaction was also observed, F(1,632) ¼ 6.08,
p ¼ .014, gp
2
¼ .01, which was decomposed with two
separate t-tests. Looking just at the cases where Jim
endorsed the moral change, it made no difference
whether the change was good (M¼ 76.00, SD¼ 16.27)
or bad (M¼ 75.49, SD¼ 16.24), t(279) ¼ .26, p ¼
.793, d ¼ .03. When Jim did not endorse the moral
change, however, he was judged to have undergone
far less change in his identity when he became a good
person (M¼ 76.62, SD¼ 20.88) compared to a bad
person (M¼ 82.98, SD¼ 14.75), t(353) ¼ $3.29, p ¼
.001, d ¼ .35, consistent with GTS (Figure 6).
Exploratory analysis. True self. A 2# 2 ANOVA
with the same design was conducted on true self.
Consistent with the identity change analysis, there was
a main effect of moral-character-change valence on
judgments about the true self, F(1,632) ¼ 163.34, p <
.001, gp
2
¼ .21, with Jim judged to be much closer to
his true self when he became a good person
(M¼ 55.18, SD¼ 29.70) compared to when he became
a bad person (M¼ 81.25, SD¼ 20.78), independent of
whether he actually endorsed the moral change from
a second-order perspective. There was also a main
effect of endorsement, F(1,632) ¼ 43.73, p ¼ .001, gp
2
¼ .07, with Jim judged to be much closer to his true
self when he endorsed the moral change (M¼ 59.19,
SD¼ 30.56) compared to when he did not endorse the
moral change (M¼ 73.52, SD¼ 26.12), independent of
whether he became a good or bad person. This time
there was no interaction (p ¼ .537). See Figure 7.
Discussion
Results from Study 6 suggest that both GTS and FT
have independent explanatory power in predicting
judgments of identity change following changes in
moral character as a consequence of drug use.
However, when it comes to judgments of distance
from the true self, the main effect of moral-character-
change valence (gp
2
¼ .21) is fully three times greater
than the effect of second-order endorsement (gp
2
¼
.07), suggesting that GTS has certain advantages over
FT in explaining participant intuitions about such
cases. Finally, in the “counterintuitive” case in which
the agent actually endorses negative changes in moral
character, participants judged far greater distance
from the true self compared to when the agent
endorsed positive changes, contrary to the prediction
of FT but consistent with that of GTS.
General discussion
In this article, we sought to extend recent work in
psychology and experimental philosophy to a peren-
nial issue in bioethics, namely, the relationship
Figure 6. Study 6 results (identity change): the effects of Jim
endorsing or not endorsing becoming a good or bad person
on judgments of identity change. Error bars represent standard
error; the Y axis has been truncated for ease of interpretation.
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between addiction and identity. But rather than focus-
ing on judgments about qualitative identity, as is typ-
ical for such discussions, we focused on judgments of
identity persistence: the extent to which an individual
is seen as the same person despite having undergone
a transformative experience.
In Study 1, we found that U.S. participants rated a
character who became addicted to drugs as far closer to
“a completely different person” than “completely the
same person” as he was before becoming addicted. In
Study 2, to see whether it was the moral or physical
aspects of the drug that were responsible for this effect,
we described the drug as medicine in one condition
(good drug), and as an addictive drug (bad drug) in
another, finding that the bad drug led to higher ratings
for identity change. In Study 3, we made explicit the
effects of addiction on moral character to narrow in on
the explanatory framework outlined in the introduction,
finding that negative changes to moral character led to
higher ratings for identity change, as predicted.
In Study 4, we ruled out vignette-specific effects by
conducting a preregistered replication and extension
in which five different characters underwent moral
improvement versus deterioration as a result of start-
ing or stopping the use of a drug. In this study we
again found that moral deterioration led to increased
ratings for identity change, as well as increased ratings
of distance from the true self, as we had predicted. In
Study 5, we decoupled the moral valence of the drug
from the moral valence of the change in character, to
resolve a potential confound. In the critical test case
in which a bad drug actually led to moral improve-
ment, the character’s identity was judged as having
changed the least, consistent with GTS. Finally, we
considered a competing explanation for our findings
based on the work of Frankfurt (1971). Although
second-order endorsement of one’s moral character
did reduce judgments of identity change and distance
from the true self compared to the lack of such
endorsement, as predicted by FT, we still showed
independent effects of moral valence of character
change as predicted by GTS. And for distance from
the true self, the direction of moral change in charac-
ter had a much bigger effect on participant judgments
about identity change than did second-order endorse-
ment, further supporting GTS.
Identity change—number or quality?
There are several questions left open by our findings.
One concerns the concept of identity at play in the rat-
ings gathered throughout the six studies. Specifically,
when someone is judged to be an “entirely different per-
son” after becoming addicted to drugs—as illustrated by
the anecdotes at the beginning of this article—we must
ask: In what sense are they seen as not the same person?
Starmans and Bloom (2018) have recently argued
that much of the current literature on identity change,
including the seminal article by Strohminger and
Nichols (2014), has been insufficiently clear about the
sense of identity being invoked. To understand such
expressions as “my son is not the same person anymore
now that he is addicted to drugs,” these authors argue, a
conceptual distinction must be drawn between changes
in numerical identity and changes in qualitative identity.
Numerical identity refers to a single entity persist-
ing over time, as when baby Jim is identical to adult
Jim. Thus, if you tickled baby Jim, and later tickled
adult Jim, you have tickled the same person twice
(Starmans and Bloom 2018). Qualitative identity, by
contrast, refers to the sharing of essential properties:
If Jim and his twin John are exactly alike in terms of
fundamental personality (and other) characteristics, they
may be qualitatively identical—that is, extremely or even
perfectly similar—but they are not numerically identical.
So, for example, it would be mistaken and morally
wrong to arrest John for a crime that Jim committed.10
Similarly, if pre-addiction Jim and post-addiction Jim
are sufficiently different from one another in terms of
Figure 7. Study 6 results (true self): the effects of Jim endors-
ing or not endorsing becoming a good or bad person on judg-
ments of distance from the true self. Error bars represent
standard error.
10James Rachels (1987) has drawn a roughly similar distinction, between
a biological life (numerical identity) and a biographical life (qualitative
identity). The relevance here is that addiction can sometimes result in
substantial changes to a person’s biography, making them qualitatively
different over time. And as Parfit (1984) argued, “what matters” for
identity is not so much persistent association with the same body, but
rather "psychological connectedness and/or psychological continuity, with
the right kind of cause” (262). If we accept such a view, what
defines ”me” has to do with my present mental states, and what is
important for personal identity are the relationships of other mental
states to those present mental states. In some cases, a person’s future
self may be more like another person than it is like the present person,
given sufficient change or discontinuity (e.g., as a result of addiction).
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fundamental personality characteristics, we might say,
“Jim is not the same person anymore,” but—according
to Starmans and Bloom—this should be understood as a
figure of speech: “a way of saying that there has been
significant psychological change, not that one person has
[literally] ceased to exist and another has been created”
(Starmans and Bloom 2018, 567). However, a recent
comment by De Freitas and colleagues (2018) emphasiz-
ing the central role of moral attributes in personal iden-
tity suggests that such expressions may not be merely
figurative but rather literal, such that there is indeed a
meaningful sense in which pre-addiction and post-
addiction Jim are numerically distinct.
We do not attempt to settle this issue here.
However, we would like to offer that the two senses
of identity may not be entirely conceptually separable.
As Mott (2018) argues, part of the justification for
statutory limitations on prosecuting certain crimes
might be based in an intuitive recognition that after
many years a person really does share less than the
full identity of the transgressor (i.e., their past self), in
some cases dropping below a threshold of qualitative
similarity sufficient to sever the link of moral respon-
sibility (see also Tobia, 2016). And in some cases, the
sheer magnitude of dissimilarity between an agent
before and after some transformative event may in
fact break the identity relation in its stricter, numer-
ical sense; philosophers disagree about such cases and
the debate rages on (for an overview, see Glannon
1998; see also Shoemaker and Tobia, forthcoming).11
But perhaps these competing accounts can in fact be
reconciled. One clue comes from work on “dual char-
acter” concepts, as described by Knobe and colleagues
(Knobe, Prasada, and Newman 2013; Newman and
Knobe 2018). A dual character concept is picked out
by both (1) a set of concrete features sufficient for or
typical of membership in the category and (2) a set of
abstract values that that those features serve to realize.
Take the concept scientist as an example. Insofar as it
is a dual character concept, it could be right to say that
although someone is technically a scientist—because
she has a degree in science, conducts experiments, and
publishes papers, thus exhibiting the relevant concrete
features for category membership—she might neverthe-
less fail to be a true scientist if her work is not
grounded in the abstract values that are essential to a
scientific worldview (i.e., careful observation, critical
thinking, updating beliefs in light of evidence, etc.).
Personal identity may be a similar sort of concept.
Thus, it could be right to say of addicted Jim that
there is a technical (i.e., numerical) sense in which he
is the same person as pre-addicted Jim: After all, he
inhabits the same body, has most of the same memo-
ries, and so on. But there may also be a deeper sense
in which it is right to say that he isn’t the same per-
son: Qualities that are central to what makes Jim the
sort of person he really is deep down inside—in short,
his true self—have in fact changed.12
To be clear, then, it is this latter sense of “not the
same person” we take people to mean when they describe
changed identity after addiction, and it is the sense we
had in mind and attempted to measure in the experi-
ments described in this article. Indeed, the very phrasing
of one of the items in our main dependent measure pre-
sumes continuity of identity in the technical or numerical
sense: When we ask participants the extent to which they
agree with the sentence “Jim is now pretty different from
what he used to be all about,” it is clear that “Jim” and
“he” must in some sense be referring to the same person,
or else the statement is incoherent.
Practical implications
What are the practical implications of our findings?
At this point, we can only speculate. However, there
may be some insight for how treatment and recovery
are ideally framed, in terms of personal identity. As
the website for a treatment facility in Florida counsels,
“You will likely see that if you’re in a relationship
with a drug addict, they become a completely different
person than the one you originally knew” upon recov-
ering from the addiction (Recovery Village 2018).
Indeed, our results support such a likelihood, as the
character Jim was judged to be far closer to a
“completely different” person than “exactly the same”
person, not only when becoming addicted, as we had
predicted and as we have emphasized throughout this
article, but also when recovering from addiction.
In this context, it is easy to imagine feeling frightened
by the prospect that the person you love—when that per-
son is currently dealing with an addiction—might
become a “completely different” person by getting treat-
ment, even though the treatment is likely to make their
life go better. Similarly, when addiction is part of an indi-
vidual’s own “deep self-identification,” as Flanagan
11We note that much of the philosophical debate about personal identity
has tended to focus on these kinds of practical concerns (e.g., desert,
blame, etc.). We thank an anonymous referee for this helpful point.
12This is, in principle, an empirical question. If participants are indeed
operating with dual-character concepts, then they should, all else equal,
be willing to endorse statements (in the context of the present study)
such as “there is a sense in which the addicted man is still Jim, but there
is also a sense in which he is not really Jim at all.” Thanks to an
anonymous referee for this helpful suggestion.
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(2013) has discussed, the prospect of losing oneself
through recovery might also be frightening, leading to a
disinclination to seek treatment in the first place.13
But if that is the worry, our findings suggest it may
be misplaced. First, becoming addicted to drugs con-
sistently led to greater perceived identity change in
our studies than recovering from addiction, suggesting
that there is less to fear (in this regard) about the lat-
ter. And second, if recovery results in an improve-
ment to a person’s moral character, although they
may indeed superficially seem quite different to when
they were dealing with addiction, on a deeper level
they are likely to be seen as moving closer to their
true self: to who they really are, deep down inside.
That may be a more comforting thought.
If our results and this interpretation of them are on
the right track, they might suggest that talking about
treatment in terms of recovering—or perhaps discover-
ing—one’s true self could be especially effective (for
related work, see Schlegel and Hicks 2011; Schlegel et al.
2009, 2011). What we have in mind are messages like the
following from The Canyon treatment center: “When
you know that alcoholism and drug addiction has taken
over your life, get your identity back by beginning drug
treatment,” and “Drug treatment helps you awaken your
personality, character, and spirituality” (The Canyon
2009, emphasis added). Similarly, another clinic notes
that “for an individual to reclaim their former self after
being affected by substance abuse, they need to be ready
to commit to serious lifestyle changes, starting with
quitting,” and “With a commitment to a healthy, more
positive lifestyle, an addicted person can surely find them-
selves again” (Mountainside 2017, emphasis added).
Indeed, we are encouraged by recent work in this vein
suggesting that consideration of an out-group member’s
true self can help to reduce intergroup bias (De Freitas
and Cikara 2018). Insofar as people with addictions are
considered part of an out-group, a focus on their good
true self may suggest new strategies for mitigating the
stigmas surrounding drug addiction—especially now that
the “brain disease” strategy has, as we noted in the intro-
duction, failed to stand up to empirical scrutiny.
Limitations and future directions
Over a series of studies, we extended recent work in
moral psychology and experimental philosophy to the
more ecologically valid context of drug addiction. But
these studies are only an initial step. For example,
there are several variables of interest we chose not to
manipulate—at least not systematically—for the sake
of simplicity: Race, gender, sexual orientation, socioe-
conomic status, and so on, are all obvious examples,
as they will undoubtedly interact in complex ways
with judgments of identity change in the context of
addiction. It may also be revealing to manipulate the
source or kind of addiction: Does addiction to alcohol
versus various kinds of drugs, or perhaps gambling,
have different implications for perceptions of identity
change? Another variable that should be manipulated
in future studies is voluntariness: Presumably, addic-
tion and drug use are more likely to be seen as mor-
ally bad when the agent appears capable of having
done otherwise, as opposed to being forced by exter-
nal pressures (including structural factors such as pov-
erty). And finally, while we report incidental findings
concerning the impact of a person’s intuitive model of
addiction—i.e., medical versus moral—on judgements
of identity change, distance from the true self, and
responsibility in the supplementary materials, these
issues require much more sustained and theoretically
driven attention. We hope to contribute to such
matters in future work.
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